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Abstract
The swift cadence of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) is at the ori-
gin of a new generation of open, ubiquitous, large-scale, complex, and heterogeneous 
information systems (IS). Inextricably linked with this evolution, a number of technical, 
administrative, and social challenges should be urgently addressed. Security and pri-
vacy in critical IS are recognized as crucial issues. The access control is well adopted as 
a typical solution for securing sensitive resources and ensuring authorized interactions 
within IS. The chapter deals mainly with the thematic of advanced access control to IS 
and particularly to relational databases. We present a synthesis of the state of the art of 
access control that encloses a study of research advancements and challenges. We intro-
duce and discuss requirements and main characteristics for deploying advanced access 
control infrastructures. Then, we discuss the problem of the conformity of concrete access 
control infrastructures, and we propose a conformity management scheme for monitor-
ing the compliance between low-level and high-level policies. Finally, we provide and 
discuss proposals and directives to enhance provably secure and compliant access con-
trol schemes as a main characteristic of future IS.
Keywords: information systems security, access control, database security, conformity, 
security policy
1. Introduction
Nowadays, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) developments bring out sig-
nificant security concerns related to the deployment and operation of IS. In fact, in today’s IS 
infrastructures characterized by their criticality, openness, complexity and heterogeneity (such 
as e-commerce, e-government, and e-health care), security and privacy are recognized as crucial 
issues. Ensuring a high level of security with a minimal overhead is the main goal of research 
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activities. Among several security mechanisms, it is commonly agreed that the access control is a 
strong driving force and is well adopted as a typical solution for ensuring a high level of protec-
tion of critical infrastructures. This mechanism is fundamental to ensure higher confidentiality 
and integrity of sensitive data and services within IS. It helps in a structured manner—generally 
enforced according to an access control policy with reference to a security policy—to define and organize 
accesses and interactions within a specific system. The standing of the access control in the protec-
tion of critical resources has been well studied in literature. Several mechanisms, approaches, and 
models have been proposed to structure, specify, and enforce access rights. As a part of this chap-
ter, we review in an exhaustive manner and discuss access control advancements. We highlight 
the evolution of access control infrastructures from traditional solutions to fine-grained solutions.
Despite the great advancements, several requirements and concerns need to be addressed 
for defining and setting up efficient and reliable access control infrastructures. Indeed, speci-
fying and enforcing a trustworthiness access control infrastructure, ensuring its coherence, 
and monitoring its conformity have now become complicated and even puzzling activities. 
Moreover, it is commonly agreed that effective and proficient administration and manage-
ment of access control infrastructures are recognized as main issues, while mastering these 
tasks is crucial as it would help to guarantee a higher security of IS. We study and discuss 
basic requirements for deploying advanced access control infrastructures. We discuss the 
problem of the conformity of concrete access control infrastructures, and we propose future 
directives to enhance provably secure and compliant access control schemes as a main char-
acteristic of future IS.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce and review 
access control advancements. In Section 3, we study and discuss main access control chal-
lenges for IS. In Section 4, we focus on advanced access control to IS. We study the main 
requirements for deploying advanced solutions, and we propose a compliance management 
solution. We present future directives to enhance provably secure and compliant access con-
trol schemes. Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter.
2. Access control advancements: from traditional approaches to fine-
grained access control
2.1. Introduction to access control
The access control is defined as any physical/logical mechanism by which a system controls 
and manages the access and the use of its resources. This mechanism allows the system to 
grant or revoke privileges for active entities (subjects) to access to or to perform some actions 
on passive entities (objects). The mechanism is also identified as authorization service or ref-
erence monitor that generally enforces access control policies.
An access control policy—in general defined in the context of a security policy—corresponds to the 
sets of rules and practices that regulate within a specific system how different resources (data 
and services) are operated, managed, and distributed. A security policy has to identify for a 
specific system the security objectives and the associated threats [1]. The policy acts mainly 
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on three levels or aspects: administrative, physical, and logical. In the administrative level, we 
focus on the organizational security and the corresponding administrative procedures within 
the organization. In the physical level, we need to define the necessary procedures and means 
to protect the set of resources from physical risks and accesses. Finally, in the logical level, 
we define legitimate and authorized actions a user can perform. This level contains a set of 
security mechanisms such as the identification, authentication, and access control.
2.2. The generic model of access control
The generic model to control access to resources in the context of databases (as an example) 
is defined according to Figure 1. (1) A subject (an active entity) requests access to a database 
object (a passive entity) to perform some actions. (2) The authorization service checks the set 
of rights granted to the subject by the defined access control policy. (3) Then, an access deci-
sion (grant or revoke) is accorded to the subject.
2.3. Access control models
The emphasis on access control for ensuring high protection of critical infrastructures has 
been extensively justified in literature. The three main reference models have been defined: 
discretionary, mandatory, and role-based access control (RBAC) models. The wide deploy-
ment and great success of the standard role-based access control model have initiated several 
research works leading to the definition of advanced models for a fine-grained access control.
2.3.1. The discretionary access control (DAC) model
The discretionary access control (DAC) model has appeared mainly with Lampson [2] in the 
1970s who defined the structure of the access control matrix based on the subject, object, and 
action notions. The model allows to restrict the access to objects on the basis of the identity of 
the subjects and/or the groups of subjects. In the DAC model, the owner of a specific resource 
fixes itself the access rights to the resource for all users of the system. Moreover, a subject 
who has an access authorization is able to pass this permission (perhaps indirectly) to other 
Figure 1. The generic model of access control.
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subjects. The controls are discretionary in the sense that the management of access rights is 
left to the discretion of the users.
2.3.2. The mandatory access control (MAC) model
The mandatory access control (MAC) [3, 4] model controls access to resources on the basis of 
the notion of security level. It associates a confidentiality level to each subject and object. The 
set of subjects and objects is classified according to corresponding confidentiality levels, and 
authorized actions are derived based on associated levels. In this model, the system manages 
directly user rights based on the corresponding security information (confidentiality levels) 
assigned to users and objects. This model was motivated by the need of providing higher 
security by preventing unauthorized accesses and protecting resources from Trojan horses.
2.3.3. The role-based access control (RBAC) model
The role-based access control (RBAC) model [5, 6] controls access to resources on the basis 
of the concept of roles assigned to users. A role represents a function within an organization. 
The model defines access rights to resources based on the roles assigned to users. A variety of 
RBAC conceptual models had been defined. The core model (noted RBAC
0
) defines, for any 
system, the minimum requirements to support the access control based on roles. The hierarchi-
cal RBAC (noted RBAC
1
) extends RBAC
0
 with the concept of role hierarchy. The constrained 
RBAC (noted RBAC
2
) extends RBAC
0
 with the notion of constraints. Constraints are a set of 
restrictions defined on RBAC components, such as static separation of duty, dynamic separa-
tion of duty, prerequisite, and cardinality constraints. The global model called consolidated 
model (noted RBAC
3
) contains both of the hierarchy and the constraint concepts. It includes 
RBAC
1
 and RBAC
2
 models and consequently the RBAC
0
model.
2.3.4. Fine-grained access control (X-BAC) models
To structure access rights and to meet specific application needs, numerous extensions have 
been proposed for the RBAC family, called X-based access control models. The ORBAC [7] 
model represents a main extension defined as a conceptual and industrial framework to 
meet security needs for sensitive healthcare communications. RBAC+ is a dynamic model 
to enforce fine-grained access control to web databases. The model extends the standard 
model with the notions of application, application profile, and sub-application session. The 
GEO-RBAC [8] model has been proposed to take into account spatial contextual informa-
tion. It is motivated by security requirements of location-based services and mobile appli-
cations as well as the increased concern for the management and sharing of geographical 
information in strategic applications like environmental protection and homeland security 
[8]. The temporal RBAC and the generalized temporal-RBAC extensions [9] are defined 
to take into account temporal contextual information and to constrain the use of permis-
sions to specific temporal periods. Several other extensions that define the concepts of 
teams (Team-BAC), tasks (task-LAC), lattice (Lattice-LAC), organizations (Organization-
BAC), or contexts (Context-LAC) have been also defined to structure rights. The concept 
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of  attribute-based access control (ABAC)  organizes access based on the evaluation of attri-
butes. RBAC extensions are defined for a fine-grained access control policy specification to 
meet new security challenges.
Content-based access control is a particular case of fine-grained access control specific to data-
base systems. In this type of access control, access decisions (to authorize or to deny an access 
request) are based mainly on the content of the data to be accessed.
2.4. Synthesis
The main discretionary access control model expressed through access matrices has been widely 
used and implemented in several applications in the commercial and academic fields, such as in 
Unix/Linux operating systems. Nonetheless, the management of permissions list is tedious and 
prone to errors in the case of a large number of users and permissions. Moreover, this model is 
difficult to administer in the case of large infrastructures and is vulnerable to Trojans.
In order to improve and strengthen access control to critical resources, several research works 
gave rise to other models, mainly the MAC model based on the definition and exploitation of 
security levels. In this context, the early defined approaches have proposed to organize the set 
of security levels in a strict order. Then, the obligation to refine and relax this constraint made 
it possible to organize the security levels according to lattices. The notion of lattice allows 
structuring the security levels according to a hierarchy that gives more freedom to adminis-
trators in the modeling of access control policies. This makes the MAC models well adapted 
to highly structured IS that require a high confidentiality, namely, military systems or sensi-
tive enterprise systems. However, in the case of large-scale organizations, it is too rigid to 
apply the MAC model since it is difficult to classify a huge number of objects and subjects in a 
predefined number of security levels. Moreover, database management systems (DBMS) that 
adopt only the MAC model as a unique access control solution had a little commercial success 
due to their rigidity and the strict hierarchy they impose on users and objects.
Even though historical access control models have introduced the concepts and generic prin-
ciples of access control, the concern to impose strict access control rules has led to the defini-
tion of the notion of structured intermediate levels between subjects and permissions. The 
general principle of the new models is to introduce a new level of indirection (defined by 
roles) between users and permissions. The main purpose of this new concept is to facilitate the 
administration of access control policies. Indeed, in role-based access control models, it is not 
necessary to update the whole access control policy when adding a new subject (user), and 
it is sufficient to assign it rights through one or more roles. Thus, the use of this intermediate 
entity (role) reduces considerably administrative errors and contributes to master difficulties 
and complexities in the management of access rights through the mechanism of inheritance 
between roles. This model of access control has received a particular attention by the research 
community and has become in its simplest or most complex form the most used model [10]. 
This huge success has made from this model a standard for access control [11]. This led to the 
elaboration of multiple models and derivations for this family of access control named X-BAC 
for the definition of a fine-grained access control.
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In order to highlight the main advancements of access control, we present in Table 1 a com-
parative study and analysis of the discussed access control models and mechanisms with 
reference to their approaches, applications, and capabilities.
From a security perspective, we present in Table 2, a summary of security analysis of the 
discussed access control models and mechanisms that identifies the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of existing approaches and their security vulnerabilities.
Features DAC MAC RBAC Fine-grained models 
(exp. ABAC)
Context of 
application
Commercial and 
academic fields: 
Unix/Linux operating 
systems
Suitable to highly 
structured IS: 
military systems 
and intelligent 
environments
Various IS Specific to particular 
applications
Implementation Access control 
matrix\access control 
and capability lists
Security levels for 
subjects and objects
Roles and 
authorization 
constraints
Specific mechanisms 
(exp. ABAC: 
attributes)
Sensitivity No fine-grained 
access control
No fine-grained 
access control
No fine-grained 
access control
Fine-grained access 
control specific 
to particular 
applications
Policy updates The policy update is 
costly
The policy update is 
costly
The policy update is 
simple
The policy update is 
simple
Policy management 
and administration
Tedious 
management, prone 
to errors, and difficult 
to administer
Requires a higher 
management to 
account and update 
security levels
Easier than previous 
models
Easier than previous 
models
Advantages Flexibility of usage
Enforces the sharing 
of information
Multilevel security
Ensures higher 
integrity
Well-adapted to 
highly structured IS
Includes the 
advantages of 
historical models
Intermediate levels 
between subjects and 
permissions
Hierarchy of roles 
and constraints
Adapted to complex 
and distributed areas
Fine-grained controls
Respond to specific 
access control needs
Solve RBAC limits
Focus on other 
concepts than roles 
(exp. attributes in 
ABAC)
Higher flexibility
Adapted to complex, 
distributed, open, 
and dynamic areas
Disadvantages Problem of scalability
No distinction 
between users and 
subjects
Security problems
Too rigid to apply
Problem of scalability
Not suitable 
to dynamic 
environments
Static access control
Requires roles 
engineering
Does not support 
contextual rules
Difficulty in 
compliance 
management
More complex to 
implement than 
RBAC
Table 1. Comparative study of access control models.
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3. Access control to databases
3.1. Mechanisms
In a database context, a number of mechanisms can be enforced in a cooperative manner for 
ensuring the control of legitimate accesses and preventing unauthorized accesses. The diver-
sity of access control mechanisms for database systems illustrates on the one hand the impor-
tance of the access control for protecting sensitive data and services and on the other hand the 
difficulty and the complexity of defining a reliable access control solution. We present in the 
following a list of the principal access control mechanisms for database systems.
• Passwords: a database management system allows to associate passwords for the identifica-
tion of users and to enforce passwords for the activation of roles.
• Privileges: a database management system allows defining a set of privileges for managing 
the empowerment of users. It provides system privileges and object privileges that allow 
users performing specific actions across the system and accessing database objects.
• Views: a view represents an important and very useful mechanism for restricting access to 
data. It is a most common mechanism adopted by database management systems to sup-
port content-based access control.
Features DAC MAC RBAC Fine-grained models 
(exp. ABAC)
Performance and 
integrity
Low: possibility to 
settle insecure rights
High: based on 
security level
High Very high
Access decision Ownership Centralized Centralized Centralized
Vulnerability Vulnerable to 
malicious programs 
such as Trojan horses 
and covert channels
Vulnerable to covert 
channels
Vulnerable to inner 
threats, particularly 
administrative 
threats
Vulnerable to inner 
threats, particularly 
administrative 
threats
Flexibility Flexible Rigid Flexible Higher flexibility
Security separation 
of duties
Does not support Does not support Static and dynamic 
separation of duties
Static and dynamic 
separation of duties
Constraints and 
conditions
Does not support Does not support Constraints 
and condition 
enforcement
Constraints 
and Conditions 
enforcement
Inference (indirect 
access)
Fail to deal with 
inferences
Fail to deal with 
inferences
Fail to deal with 
inferences
Requires specific 
study to each model
Transitivity No control on 
transitive access flow
Transitivity is 
controlled
Transitivity is 
controlled
Transitivity is 
controlled
Least privilege and 
delegation of rights
Supports Does not support Supports Supports
Table 2. Security analysis of access control models.
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• Triggers: triggers allow to automatically enforce access restrictions as well as security rules. 
They especially allow enforcing authorization constraints mainly pre- and post-authoriza-
tion constraints.
• Stored procedures: stored procedures may be used in order to define privileges associated 
with a user’s job functions and to ensure that access to data and services are performed ac-
cording to the defined rules.
• Encryption mechanisms: a number of encryption mechanisms contribute to access control for 
databases. They concern several applications, such as password encryption, data encryption, 
digital signature, authorization tickets, etc.
• Access control policies: it consists on enforcing access control policies based on different 
models such as DAC, MAC, RBAC, etc. Indeed, database management systems provide 
mechanisms based on different access control models allowing the management of access 
rights.
• Specific mechanisms: this type of mechanisms is context dependent and specific to every 
DBMS. As an example, we cite the component Oracle Database Vault that allows restricting 
access to sensitive data even for database administrators.
3.2. Policy enforcement
In a database context, enforcing an access control policy consists in deploying within a data-
base system, generally in a distributed manner, the schema of the access control policy. This 
distribution of the policy between different active components of the system ensures a better 
management of access requests and operations of the database resources. In fact, an access 
control policy is often spread over several levels. (i) The first level is defined by the data-
base management system itself. Indeed, a DBMS makes it possible to define and store in 
its depository (data dictionary) a set of information and access rules allowing it to control 
and manage access to data. (ii) The second level is defined by application servers that allow 
restricting access to applications and data. (iii) The third level is relative to the application 
part. Indeed, the software application can manage itself the level of accreditation of users, 
and it connects to the database under its own logical identity and decides which information 
the users can consult, modify, etc. (iv) The fourth level belongs to the set of privileges associ-
ated to different actors of the system and defined in the directories of users and operating 
systems of the IS.
3.3. Challenges
Even though, the access control is becoming increasingly important for protecting sensitive 
data in critical systems; several issues are recognized as crucial challenges in today’s access 
control infrastructures. In fact, the efficient and secure administration and management of 
access control infrastructures, the safety analysis of access control models, and the risk assess-
ment in access control systems are recognized as fundamental issues. Moreover, setting up a 
trustworthiness environment of access control and monitoring its compliance and coherence 
have emerged as complicated and confusing tasks. Indeed, in unreliable and untrustworthy 
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environment, the administration of access control policies considered as a fundamental 
 security aspect generally raises a critical analysis problem when the process of administration 
is distributed and/or potentially untrusted users contribute to this process. As a consequence, 
collusion attempts and inner threats may take place to generate crucial and invisible breaches 
to circumvent the access control policy. Moreover, an administrator via its administrative 
privileges has power increasingly disputed when the safety of data is threatened [12]. Given 
that administrative roles are naturally powerful, if they are not used in cautious manner, a 
malicious administrator or a powerful user can corrupt the policy and create other breaches 
difficult to identify.
In database context, most of existing DBMS use the closed-world policy as a main authoriza-
tion model. Under this circumstance, whenever a user tries to access a database object and 
no authorization rule is found, the access is denied. Hence, the lack of authorizations is inter-
preted as no authorization. Nonetheless, this policy has a major drawback since it does not 
prevent the user from receiving the required authorization some times in the future [13]. 
Moreover, most of existing DBMS act as a black box, and it is difficult for administrators and 
security architects to identify the actual state and the compliance level of the concrete policy 
enforced by the DBMS. Recently, researchers are convinced of the urgency of this topic given 
the challenges of securing data. A few attempts addressed the topic of reverse engineering of 
access control policies to externalize the low-level schema of an access control policy enforced 
by a relational DBMS [14, 15].
4. Advanced access control
Advanced access control solutions should provide an efficient and flexible access control with 
a reasonable (minimal) overhead for ensuring a higher protection of private data and sensitive 
resources. From a security perspective, we consider that a reliable and trusted access control 
infrastructure for future information systems should take into account several requirements 
and should provide a minimum of security features.
4.1. Requirements
4.1.1. Confidentiality and integrity
In critical systems, it is compulsory to consider and treat sensitive data and services as confi-
dential resources which integrity should be preserved. In this context, the confidentiality and 
the integrity of the IS resources must be preserved, and a main requirement for the access 
control system is that it should not allow in any way illegal accesses and unauthorized exploi-
tation of the system resources.
4.1.2. Privacy
In open and untrustworthy environments, preserving the privacy of different users and actors 
in a critical system is highly required. The access control solution should consider the protec-
tion of private data as well as the preservation of a high level of secrecy as main objectives.
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4.1.3. Authenticity
The authenticity of the actors of the system is an important aspect that needs to be taken into 
account by the access control solution. Ensuring the authenticity in the system relies princi-
pally on the validation of the origins and the identities of the different actors of the system. In 
order to ensure a high level of authenticity, the access control system should dispose of reliable 
identification and authentication mechanisms such as cryptographic and digital signature.
4.1.4. Robustness
The access control system must ensure a high level of robustness in the sense that inappropri-
ate and unauthorized accesses should not be expected. The access control rules have to be 
rigorous enough to authorize desired accesses and prevent illegal accesses. The robustness 
of the access control as a crucial question is described with the levels of confidentiality and 
privacy provided by the system.
4.1.5. Flexibility
In critical infrastructures, such as healthcare and commercial systems, emergency accesses 
should be preserved by the access control system. In this case, the access control system must 
integrate flexible controls as regards to emergency cases. The flexibility needs to be integrated 
in a smooth and transparent manner to permit emergency accesses based on a delegation of 
rights or an overriding of access privileges.
Moreover, revoking access privileges is an important aspect that should be considered by 
access control solutions. Indeed, the access control system should be flexible in the sense that 
it should allow revoking access rights in an easy manner especially in critical situations when 
users abuse the trust and threaten the IS.
4.1.6. Non-repudiation
In order to pass up incidents linked to user’s irresponsibility and negligence, it is recom-
mended that the access control system has to integrate non-repudiation mechanisms such as 
auditability. This helps mainly in auditing illegal access and collusion attempts that allows 
strengthening the system with the corresponding prevention rules and controls.
4.1.7. Administration, management, and compliance
An access control system has to remain compliant and coherent with regard to the validated 
requirements without alterations. The necessity of integrating flexible controls in the system 
should not be at the origin of the non-compliance situations. In this context, we verify that a 
secure and efficient management of the access control infrastructure is a main requirement that 
has a wide impact on the quality of the system. Indeed, a faulty access control policy, a miss-
configuration of the policy, or flaws in the policy and system deployment can result in serious 
vulnerabilities. A reliable management helps to precisely capture the security properties and 
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needs that access control should adhere to bridge the gap of abstraction between the access 
control policy and the corresponding mechanisms.
4.2. Compliance management
The traditional life cycle of an access control policy defines three main phases: the specifica-
tion, the verification, and the implementation of the policy. Then, the policy evolves with 
reference to maintenance and administrative tasks, following the evolution of security needs. 
Throughout its life cycle, the policy can undergo confused alterations: (i) It may record illegal 
updates and non-compliant changes with regard to its original specification. This generally 
occurs following an intrusion attempt or an illegal delegation of rights. (ii) It may contain 
incoherent and conflicting access control rules. This generally occurs following inner threats 
and collusion attempts and particularly in case the policy is defined by using more than a 
unique model of access control that leads to redundancy, inconsistency, and contradiction in 
the expression of the policy. We consider that the identification of the discrepancies between 
the abstract level of the access control policy (the specification) and its concrete level is crucial 
since correct operation and enforcement of access control policies by corresponding applica-
tions rely on the hypothesis that the specifications are correct and valid.
In large-scale, open and untrustworthy environments, the administration and management of 
an access control policy (considered as main security aspects) generally raise a critical analy-
sis problem in case of a distributed administration of the policy, and/or potentially untrusted 
users (in most cases represent malicious administrators) contribute to the administration 
process. As a consequence, collusion attempts and inner threats may take place to generate 
crucial and invisible breaches to circumvent the policy. In fact, a faulty access control policy, 
a miss-configuration of the policy, or flaws in the policy and system deployment can result 
in serious vulnerabilities. In a database management system (DBMS) context, we easily check 
that as business and private data is exposed to several security threats and attacks, an access 
control policy is also subject to the same dangers [16]. According to Imperva Application Defense 
Center reports in 2013 and 2015, Excessive and Unused Privileges and Privilege Abuse are identi-
fied as most critical threats in top 10 database security threats.
Moreover, in the context of healthcare and e-healthcare systems (as a typical critical infra-
structures), access control solutions should be rigorous to ensure a higher protection and flex-
ible to treat emergency cases. We check that the simultaneous coupling of two necessary but 
contradictory objectives (robustness and flexibility) has a direct influence and a wide impact 
on the compliance of the deployed access control policy [17].
Our proposal to address issues related to the deployment and management of access control 
policies extends the traditional life cycle of access control policies with pertinent phases that 
we consider as necessary activities for ensuring the trustworthiness and the compliance of 
security policies. We consider three main levels of compliance management of access control 
infrastructures like illustrated in Figure 2. The first level concerns the management of the 
conformity between security and functional needs and the specification and design of the 
access control system. Indeed, a main requirement in the deployment of the access control 
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infrastructure is specifying security and business needs, mastering, and validating its basics 
and expressiveness. Then, evolving the policy according to new security and business needs 
is highly required to maintain coherence between security needs and the high-level policy.
The second level concerns the management of the compliance between the specification of the 
policy and its concrete implementation. This level ensures the identification of faulty access 
control policy, miss-configurations or flaws in the policy and the system that can result in 
serious vulnerabilities. To ensure a high level of trustworthiness, it is highly recommended 
to proceed with verifying the conformity between the specification and the first implemented 
instance of the policy and particularly before the concrete exploitation of the system. The 
third level concerns the management of the compliance between the high-level policy as a 
reference model and any concrete instance of the policy. This helps detecting illegal updates 
and non-compliant changes in the concrete instance with regard to its original specification. 
It allows also identifying incoherent and conflicting access control rules occurred following 
inner threats and collusion attempts.
To ensure an efficient and secure deployment and management of reliable access control 
policies, we cover three key security aspects like illustrated in Figure 3. (i) The specifica-
tion, verification, and implementation of the policy invariants, (ii) the validation of a con-
crete (implemented) instance of the policy regarding its original specification, and (iii) the 
adjustment and optimization of the access control policy schema. In fact, the goal during 
Figure 2. Compliance management levels.
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the specification phase is to capture the maximum of security needs and to distinguish the 
invariants that must meet any concrete instance of the access control policy. Security architects 
dispose, during this phase, of security modeling languages that extend classical application 
modeling languages. Verifying the exactitude of the specification and adopting a model-driven 
architecture (MDA) approach are highly interesting in system development and allow espe-
cially reaching the implementation via successive refinements of the verified specification. 
During the validation phase, the reference stage (the specification) and the concrete instance 
are facing in a logical framework allowing formal reasoning and compliance demonstration. 
To do so, two preliminary phases are necessary: a reverse engineering phase that allows gen-
erating the schema of the implemented policy and a formalization phase for representing the 
extracted policy in our formal framework. The optimization phase corrects the redundancy 
anomalies and helps check the properties of the graph of roles, calculate the power of a role, 
etc. Obtained results allow the adjustment and the up to date of the corresponding policy.
4.3. Future directives
4.3.1. Compliance management of distributed policies
Today’s IS generally comprises several heterogynous components. Securing the IS requires 
mainly defining and enforcing a global security policy to be distributed on several active 
components that participate—in a collective manner—to the system security. The security 
architect is responsible for defining a global access control policy (GACP) and for defining the 
sub-policies (ACP
1
, ACP
n
) relative to each active component in the system such as firewalls 
(FW), database management systems (DBMS), application servers (AS), operating systems 
(OS), enterprise directory services (LDAP), etc.
Figure 3. Formal approach of compliance management.
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A global management of the compliance of the global access control policy enforced by the IS 
consists in monitoring the conformity of all sub-access control policies enforced by active com-
ponents separately and in verifying the conformity of the global policy taking into account 
the interactions between those components, like illustrated by Figure 4. As a future research 
direction, a global compliance management process—which integrates compliance manage-
ment of sub-policies—should be defined and investigated for a global check of the conformity 
of the global policy taking into account interactions between active components of the system.
4.3.2. Reverse engineering access control policies
The management of the compliance of access control policies within databases relies on a 
reverse engineering step for externalizing the concrete implementation of a policy from the 
DBMS. In literature, numerous research works addressed the thematic of retro-conception 
or reverse engineering in the context of relational databases. This was at the origin of the 
development of professional tools for databases reverse engineering. Existing tools allow to 
generate the functional model of a concrete database, while they do not allow to generate the 
complete security model. In other words, they do not offer the opportunity to extract all the 
components of persistent access control policies. The reverse engineering procedure is based 
on the exploitation of the DBMS data dictionary.
Actually, a few research works addressed this important topic and defined reverse engineer-
ing techniques for extracting concrete policies from the Oracle DBMS [14, 15]. Even though, 
Figure 4. Distributed compliance management.
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defined reverse engineering approaches can be generalized, we need specific reverse engi-
neering procedures relative to each DBMS. A main contribution in this thematic is to define 
specific reverse engineering techniques relative to other familiar database management sys-
tems such as Informix, MySQL, etc.
4.3.3. Compliance management of access control policies in the context of object and NoSQL 
databases
The fact that the concepts and principles of object-oriented and NoSQL databases are com-
pletely different from traditional databases (mainly relational databases), the application of 
traditional security controls is not adequate for providing effective security measures for 
object-oriented and NoSQL databases. Due to the specificity of object databases, we need—in 
a future research directive—to define the necessary techniques for monitoring the compliance 
of implemented access control policies in object-oriented DBMS.
5. Conclusion
Addressing security issues in today’s information system requires mainly defining a trust-
worthy environment of access control. In this chapter, we review the actual state of research 
in access control to highlight the main advancements and challenges. We introduce and dis-
cuss requirements and the main characteristics for deploying advanced access control infra-
structures. We illustrate that the management of the compliance of today’s access control 
infrastructures represents a main issue for the deployment of secure systems. To address this 
thematic, we discuss the problem of the conformity of concrete access control infrastructures, 
and we propose a conformity management scheme for monitoring the compliance between 
low-level and high-level policies. Moreover, we highlight some future research directives that 
comply with the discussed thematic.
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